

Vice President 37a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info.

ACTION: USUN, New York - PRIORITY 1359

Nov 23 9 43 PM '62

EYES ONLY

013

FOR STEVENSON AND McCLOY ~~REDACTED~~

SUBJECT: Next Steps in New York Negotiations

EYES ONLY

PASS
ELEC.
TO
EXCOM

You should see Kuznetsov promptly, to discuss next steps in effecting understanding of October 27 and 28. You should begin by emphasizing our desire that this be wound up very promptly, a desire Chairman Khrushchev evidently shares. Ways and means of ending matter should be governed by this requirement.

present SC scenario contained DEPTTEL 1338,
You should/give Kuznetsov our draft declaration (revised text of final paragraphs in next message), and explain it to him as the most we can do—and more than was originally promised—in the light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. You should request prompt study and response. At the same time you should indicate that we do not REPEAT not want a long and fruitless haggle in the UN over differences which undoubtedly exist between what they would like and what we would like, particularly since some of these differences may wither away over time if things go well. Such a haggle is not in their interest either. If our statement is one which they could not live with in UN, we believe a satisfactory wind-up can be obtained by use of a Presidential statement, as in last press conference, which

/Soviets

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Authority: State for 6/14/97
By: [Signature], NARS, Date 7/12/97

Drafted by

GBall/ck

11/23/62

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Soviets can readily interpret as promised assurance against invasion. We note with interest Chairman's last message which does indeed interpret President's last press conference in this way.

You should emphasize that there is in fact no present danger of invasion of Cuba, but that we cannot be put in position of giving a blanket guarantee to a man who has refused to cooperate with UN to fulfill understanding of October 27 and 28.

If Kuznetsov's initial response is cool, you may wish to press the point that exchanges between President and Chairman show no such Soviet position and that it may be helpful for Kuznetsov and perhaps Mikoyan to see President in Washington early next week so that negotiations in New York will not get out of phase with promising exchanges between Washington and Moscow.

If Kuznetsov presses Caribbean inspection scheme you should express readiness to discuss this point and point out again that any inspection of US would require inspection of USSR. We anticipate that these matters can well be discussed at Geneva in connection with negotiation on surprise attack. This is obviously a complex problem going well beyond initial understanding and requiring long discussion. Therefore we should not hold up all exchanges of assurances pending such an agreement but should promptly do the best we can in the light of Castro's position and move on to other issues. We of course have ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ confidence in your ability to persuade Kuznetsov that our draft declaration is an ideal solution.

END

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RUSK